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IV 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78A-3-102(3)(j) (orders Judgments, and decrees of any court of record 
over which the Court of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the trial court err in holding that Plaintiff Kent S. Turner ("Turner") failed to 
state a claim for relief against Defendant Staker & Parson Companies ("Staker") because 
Turner's claim is barred by the construction statute of limitations (UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-2-225), and because Staker was not "any person in actual possession or control of 
the improvement" for purposes of the exception set forth in subsection (8) of the statute? 
This Court reviews the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss "for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court's ruling." Oahvood Vill. LLC v. Albertsons, Inc., 
2004 UT 101, \ 9, 104 P.3d 1226. In reviewing the trial court's decision, this Court 
"accept[s] the factual allegations in the complaint as true and interprets] those facts and 
all inferences drawn from them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff as the non-
moving party." Id. Similarly, a trial court's interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
that this Court reviews de novo. Ellis v. Estate of Ellis, 2007 UT 77, ^ 6, 169 P.3d 441. 
This issue was preserved in Turner's memoranda and at oral argument. (R. at 27-
32; 48-50; 71 [9:14 to 14:24].) 
1 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS 
The interpretation of the following statutory provision is determinative of this 
appeal. 
The time limitation imposed by this section does not apply to any action 
against any person in actual possession or control of the improvement as 
owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition 
of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(8). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature, Course, and Disposition of Proceedings 
Turner brought this action asserting a negligence claim against Staker and Atlas 
Engineering, L.L.C. ("Atlas") for injuries Turner sustained in a car accident while driving 
through a portion of 1-15 that was being repaved by Staker. (R. at 1-6.) In lieu of 
answering Turner's Complaint, Staker filed its Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a 
Claim (the "Motion to Dismiss"), arguing that Turner's claim was barred by the 
construction statute of limitations. (R. at 13-14.) Turner opposed Staker's Motion to 
Dismiss and simultaneously filed his First Amended Complaint. (R. at 21-32.) After the 
Motion to Dismiss was fully briefed, the trial court heard oral argument and announced 
that it was granting the motion. (R. at 71 [19:11].) Staker then filed a proposed order, to 
which Turner objected. (R. at 44-50.) The trial court subsequently issued its Order of 
Dismissal oj Deje/idaul Staker & Parson Companies, a Utah Limited Liability 
Corporation [sic], with Prejudice (the "Order"). (R. at 51-54.) Because Atlas had not 
appeared or joined in Staker's motion, Turner moved the trial court to certify the Order as 
2 
final pursuant to Rule 54(b) (R. at 55-56), and the trial court promptly issued an order of 
certification (R. at 62-64). This appeal followed. (R. at 65-67.) 
Statement of Facts 
Turner filed his Complaint on July 13, 2010. (R. at 1.) Turner's Complaint 
alleges the following facts: 
During the summer of 2006, Staker, as the contractor for the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT'), performed rotomill and 
overlay of 1-15 near Spanish Fork, Utah (the "Project"), Staker was 
responsible for assessing, implementing, and maintaining adequate 
safety measures in connection with the Project. Staker and/or UDOT 
hired Atlas to prepare a safety plan for the purpose of adequately 
warning motorists of the dangers associated with traveling through the 
construction site. Immediately after the commencement of the Project, 
an inordinate number of accidents began to occur as a result of vehicles 
clogging and backing up as they approached the construction site. 
During the approximately two-week duration of the Project, there were 
at least 19 car accidents, and at least one fatality. 
On the afternoon of July 17, 2006, Turner merged onto the 
northbound lanes of 1-15 via an onramp in Benjamin, Utah. Just beyond 
a corner and incline north of the Benjamin onramp, traffic had backed up 
and stopped. The traffic backup was not visible to approaching traffic 
because of the bend in the road and overpasses that obstructed the view. 
Between the Benjamin onramp and the corner, Staker had not posted 
sufficient signs or warnings, if any, that would have alerted Turner to the 
possibility that traffic would be stopped ahead. When Turner rounded 
the blind corner, he abruptly discovered the traffic backup and 
unavoidably collided with a vehicle ahead of him (the "Accident"). 
As a result of the Accident, Turner suffered severe injuries, 
including two fractured femurs, two fractured tibias, a fractured foot and 
heel, fractured ribs, lacerated fingers, a lacerated spleen, and a lacerated 
liver. Turner was required to undergo extensive surgery and procedures 
to treat his injuries. turner wjb in the ICU for three weekb in a 
medically induced coma, in the intermediate ICU for one week, and in 
regular care for one week. Turner was also in a rehabilitation center for 
three weeks. 
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When I urner finally returned home (in a wheelchair), he required 
home health care and physical therapy for one month before he could 
begin outpatient therapy, which continues to this da>. Despite the 
extensive and expensive medical care he has received, Turner will suffer 
chronic pain and limitations on his ability to live a normal life. Turner 
was a practicing dentist for more than 35 years prior to the Accident, but 
as a result of his injuries, he was forced to sell his dental practice in 
Salem, Utah under distressed circumstances. Turner will never again be 
physically able to folly pursue his career, and he has been deemed 
disabled by the Social Security Administration. 
(R at 1 6 ) Stal ;:ei did i lot f ilc: an ai is < v ei , bi it it istead 1 iled its I vlolioi I It ) Disri iiss. (R at 
13-14.) Turner opposed the Motion to Dismiss and simultaneously filed his First 
Amended Complaint, which contains the following additional allegation: 
23. At the time of the Accident, Defendants were in actual 
possession or control of the roadway and the improvements thereon, 
which proximately caused Turner's injuries. 
(R. at 23.) 
Ii i tl ie i i let i IOI ai idi u. i i si ippoi tir ig its IVic >tk »i i to Disn ii: ^'.M.. . •-. -I tl lat becai ise 
Turner's injury had occurred on Jul) 17, 2006, and the Complaint had noi been filed until 
July 13, 2010, Turner's claims were barred by UTAH CODE A N N . § 78B-2-225, which 
provide .vo-vear statute of1 uons for claii i is ai isii ig it oi i i cei tain c onstn iction-
related ihjuiio.
 VK. at 15-20.) i uiiier opposed the Motion to Dismiss, arguing that 
Turner's claims against Staker ?}'-'*'• 4ie exception to the two-year period of 
limitations because Staker was in "actilal possession or control of the improvement" at 
the time of his injury. (R. at 27-32.) In its reply meinorandum, Staker argued that 
because Turner alleged that Staker was a contractor for UDOl it was UDOT—not 
Staker—who was in actual possession or control of the improvement. (R. at 33-38.) 
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At oral argument, the trial court announced that it would grant the Motion to 
Dismiss, but would do so "reluctantly." (R. at 71 [19:11].) The trial court did not 
explain the basis for its ruling, and it acknowledged that no Utah appellate decisions had 
directly addressed the issue. (R. at 71 [19:2-19].) When Staker submitted a proposed 
order, Turner filed an objection in an effort to clarify the basis for the trial court's ruling. 
(R. at 44-50.) The trial court subsequently issued its Order, which explained as follows: 
Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege that Defendant 
Staker & Parson Companies was in actual possession or control of the 
improvement. . . . In addition, Plaintiff makes no claim that Defendant 
Staker & Parson Companies were in actual possession or control as 
owner, tenant or otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition 
of the improvement proximately caused the injury. 
The State of Utah (UDOT) is not a lessor/landlord and Defendant 
Staker & Parson Companies was not a tenant on 1-15. Defendant Staker 
& Parson Companies was not the owner of 1-15; Defendant Staker & 
Parson Companies did not own the fee and did not have the right to sell, 
convey, or dispose of 1-15. 
The term "otherwise" means "in a different manner, in another 
way, or in other ways." A Court must assume that each term in a statute 
or regulation was used advisedly; thus, words are read literally, unless 
such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. "Otherwise" 
must be read as akin to or of the same nature as "ownership" or 
"tenancy" and by virtue of that, Defendant Staker & Parson Companies 
had the legal right to possess and control 1-15. No such allegation 
appears in the pleadings. In fact, the only allegation, that Defendant 
Staker & Parson Companies was a contractor, casts Defendant Staker & 
Parson Companies as a "provider" under § 78B-2-225(2)(e) . . . . 
Defendant Staker & Parson Companies as a contracting provider was not 
an "owner, tenant, or otherwise" of 1-15. Accordingly, as a matter of 
law, § 78B-2-225(8) does not applv. 
(R. at 53 (emphasis in original).) 
5 
SUMMARY Mi AKlxUMENTS 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225 sets forth a statute of limitations and a statute of 
repose for claims against contractors, developers, designers, and others providing 
conslrih (iuti-H LtWil piodm) i * pi" su\ in", \ tspiv'J pri-.on;il IM|UIN I'Liiiii is -a ih|t/\ I \u n 
four-year statute of limitations, but when construction is involved, that period is reduced 
to two years. However, Section 225(8) provides that the statute is not applicable to 
cl.»-!- !M.-UL:I.: J. .mi : s:iy person in acti ml possession, or control of tl le ii i ipro\ en lei it as 
owner, tenant, or otherwise" at the time of the injury. Turner filed his action against 
Staker more than two years, bi it less than four years, after the date of his injury. 
However, because Staker was directing and managing, on site, mv \\<n u ; ne 
improvement at the time oi iumci b mjuiy, i>t---- uun v&; makes ihv . limitation 
inapplicable to Turner's claim against Staker. 
In granting Staker's Motion to Dismiss, the trial court erred by focusing on 
1 urner's faih ire to affin i lal i\ el;; ' pie ad tl mt Stake i vv as ii i. acti i.atIII. possession oi conti c 1 of I -
1" ! he appropriate inquiry was noi whether Turner expressly alleged that Staker was in 
actual possession or control, but whether 11irner's allegations conclusn cl\ foreclosed the 
possibn - - . . : i. .hi ierences in 
favor of Turner, his Complaint clearly did not do so. Moreover, J uinei :> first Amended 
Complaint did, in fact, allege that Staker was in actual possession or control of T-l 5 The 
trial court further erred in assuming the existence of fac1 * * 
6 
Turner, and which were not supported by any record evidence. The trial court's 
misapplication of Rule 12(b)(6), in itself, warrants reversal. 
However, this Court should nevertheless consider the inevitable issue that will 
arise on remand, which is whether subsection (8) applies in the event Staker proves it did 
not have a legal right to possess 1-15. In finding that subsection (8) did not apply to 
Staker because Staker was not an owner or tenant of 1-15, the trial court erred in several 
respects. First, the trial court erred to the extent it concluded that subsection (8) 
categorically excludes "providers" such as Staker from its purview. Section 225 applies 
solely to "providers," and the exception would be meaningless if "providers" were 
categorically excluded. 
Second, the cardinal rule of interpreting statutes is to determine legislative intent 
by looking at the plain language of the statute as a whole, and non-technical terms should 
be interpreted in accordance with their plain and ordinary meaning. In construing the 
phrase "as owner, tenant, or otherwise," the trial court failed to apply the plain and 
ordinary meaning of the term "otherwise," which refers to a person who is not an owner 
or a tenant. In finding that "otherwise" means "akin," the trial court stepped over the 
plain language to define "otherwise" in a manner exactly the opposite of its plain and 
ordinary meaning. In construing subsection (8) to require a legal right of possession, the 
trial court impermissibly rendered the term "control" superfluous. The trial court also 
failed to consider the legislative purpose expressly set forth in the statute, which indicates 
an intent to protect "providers" from remote and unexpected liability. The trial court's 
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conclusion that subsection (8) requires a legal right to possess real property does not 
effectuate the Legislature's intent, since a legal right to possess real property would not 
have made Turner's action against Staker any more or less remote or unexpected. 
Third, the trial court improperly employed ejusdem generis to conclude that 
"otherwise" meant akin to an owner or tenant. Ejusdem generis is a secondary rule of 
construction that should only be used where a statute is ambiguous, and subsection (8) is 
not ambiguous. Additionally, it was improper to use ejusdem generis to interpret a 
statute in a manner contrary to the legislative intent and plain meaning of the statute. The 
trial court's reliance on ejusdem generis led to a result inconsistent with legislative intent 
and completely opposite of what the plain language demands. Finally, because the terms 
"owner" and "tenant" cover every conceivable type of possessory interest in property, it 
was improper to conclude that the term "otherwise" should be interpreted as defining a 
class similar to an owner or tenant. 
In short, the trial court failed to properly review Staker's Motion to Dismiss under 
the standards of Rule 12(b)(6), and it also misconstrued subsection (8) by discarding the 
plain language and intent of the statute in favor of a secondary rule of construction. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT TURNER FAILED TO 
STATE A CLAIM UPON WHICH RELIEF CAN BE GRANTED. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225 provides both a statute of limitations and a statute 
of repose for claims related to improvements in real property. Nearly every state in the 
union has adopted a construction-specific statute of limitations/repose, and a slight 
8 
majority has adopted an exception similar to that found in subsection (8) of Utah's 
statute. Section 225 generally provides that a claim against a "provider" that is not 
based in contract or warranty must be commenced within two years of when the cause of 
action was or should have been discovered. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(3)(b). The 
term "provider" is defined as any individual or entity that in any way contributes to or 
provides services "for or in relation to an improvement." Id. § 78B-2-225(f). The term 
"improvement" is defined as "any building structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other 
similar man-made change, addition, modification, or alteration to real property." Id. § 
78B-2-225(d). Thus, although the statute of limitations is typically four years in a 
personal injury action, see Jenkins v. Percival, 962 P.2d 796, 805 (Utah 1998); UTAH 
For statutes with the same or a similar exception, see ALA. CODE § 6-5-221; ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 16-56-112; CAL CODE CIV. PROC § 337.1; COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-104; 
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-584a; DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 8127; D.C. CODE § 12-310; GA. 
CODE ANN. § 9-3-52; IDAHO CODE § 5-241; LA. REV. STAT. § 9:2772; Miss. CODE ANN. § 
15-1-41; Mo. REV. STAT. § 516.097; MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-2-208; N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 508:4-b; N.J. STAT. § 2A: 14-1.1; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1 -50; N.D. CENT. CODE, § 28-
01-44; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.131; OR. REV. STAT. § 12.135; PA. CONS. STAT tit. 
42, § 5536; S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-3-670; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 15-2A-4; TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 28-3-205; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & R E M . CODE § 16.009; VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-250; 
WYO. STAT. § 1-3-112. 
For statutes with no similar exception, see ALASKA STAT. § 09.10.055; ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. § 12-552; FLA. STAT. § 95.11; HAW. REV. STAT. § 657-8; I I I . COMP. STAT. Ch. 
735, § 5/13-214; IND. CODE ANN. § 32-30-1-5; IOWA CODE § 614.1(11); KENTUCKY REV. 
STAT. §413.135; MAINE REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 7 5 2 - A ; M D . COURTS & JUDICIAL 
PROCEEDINGS CODE ANN. § 5-108; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 260, § 2B; MICH. COMP. LAWS 
§ 600.5839: MTNN. STAT. § 541.051: NER. RFV. STAT. 25-223: NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
11.203; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-27, OKL. STAT. UI. 12, § 109; R.i. GEN. LAWS § 9-1-29, 
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.16.300; W. VA. CODE § 55-2-6a; Wis. STAT. § 893.89. 
Kansas, New York, and Vermont appear to be the only states that do not have a 
construction-specific statute of limitations/repose. 
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CODE ANN. § 78B-2-307, that period is reduced to two years if the claim is against a 
"provider" of an "improvement" to real property. In this case, Turner was injured on July 
17, 2006 and filed his action against Staker on July 13, 2010—less than four years but 
more than two years after the date of injury. Because Staker appears to be a "provider," 
Turner's claim against Staker falls within the purview of the two-year limitation. 
However, Section 225 contains an important exception to the general rule: 
The time limitation imposed by this section does not apply to any action 
against any person in actual possession or control of the improvement as 
owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition 
of the improvement proximately causes the injury for which the action is 
brought. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(8). Here, the trial court found that Staker did not fall 
within the exception set forth in subsection (8). As explained below, the trial court erred 
because it misapplied the standard for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and because it 
incorrectly construed the exception set forth in subsection (8) to require a legal right to 
possess real property. Turner's claim against Staker fits the exception to Section 225, 
and his claim is not time-barred. The trial court's ruling should therefore be reversed. 
A. The Trial Court Failed to Apply the Correct Standard for Granting a 
Rule 12(b)(6) Motion. 
"Under rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a motion to dismiss is proper 
'only where it clearly appears that the plaintiff or plaintiffs would not be entitled to relief 
under the facts alleged or under any state of facts they could prove to support their 
claim.'" Bennett v. Jones, Waldo, Holbrook & McDonough, 2003 UT 9, ^ 30, 70 P.3d 17 
(quoting Clark v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2001 UT 90, ^ 14, 34 P.3d 209). In reviewing 
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a motion to dismiss, a court should "assume that the factual allegations in the complaint 
are true and [should] draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff." Patterson v. Am. Fork City, 2003 UT 7, % 9, 67 P.3d 466 (quoting Valley 
Colour, Inc. v. Beuchert Builders, Inc., 944 P.2d 361, 362 (Utah 1997)). "The bar of the 
statute of limitations is properly raised by a motion to dismiss when the necessary facts 
appear on the face of the pleadings'" Tucker v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2002 UT 
54, Tj 8, 53 P.3d 947 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). A court may consider matters 
outside the pleadings only if it treats the motion as a motion for summary judgment and 
"giv[es] all parties the 'reasonable opportunity to present all material made pertinent to 
such a motion."' Id. ^11 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)). 
In ruling that Turner had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, 
the trial court explained, in relevant part: "Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege 
that Defendant Staker & Parson Companies was in actual possession or control of the 
improvement." (R. at 53.) This statement patently misconceives the relevant standard 
for evaluating a motion filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). The relevant question was not 
whether Turner affirmatively pleaded that Staker was in actual possession or control of 
the improvement, but whether Turner's allegations conclusively demonstrated that Turner 
could never prove any facts that would demonstrate that Staker was in actual possession 
or control—especially given that Staker bears the burden to prove its affirmative 
defenses. Moreover, paragraph 23 of Turner's First Amended Complaint did, in fact, 
allege that Staker was "in actual possession or control of the roadway and the 
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improvements thereon." (R. at 23.) To the extent this allegation was too conclusory to 
be taken as true, the remainder of Turner's complaint—drawing all reasonable inferences 
in favor of Turner—does not conclusively foreclose the possibility that Staker was not in 
actual possession or control of the improvement. Among other things, Turner alleged 
that Staker performed work on 1-15, that Staker was responsible for maintaining adequate 
safety measures, and that Staker hired a subcontractor to assist it in preparing a safety 
plan. (R. at 24-25.) These allegations affirmatively support the notion that Staker could 
have been in actual possession or control of the improvement. In any event, there is 
simply no authority to support the proposition that Turner was required to affirmatively 
plead facts to support an exception to a waivable affirmative defense. 
In ruling on the Motion to Dismiss, the trial court further explained: 
The State of Utah (UDOT) is not a lessor/landlord and Defendant 
Staker & Parson Companies was not a tenant on 1-15. Defendant Staker 
& Parson Companies was not the owner of 1-15; Defendant Staker & 
Parson Companies did not own the fee and did not have the right to sell, 
convey, or dispose of 1-15. 
(R. at 53.) However, none of these facts appear on the face of Turner's Complaint. (R. at 
1-6.) Additionally, the trial court did not treat the Motion to Dismiss as a motion for 
summary judgment, nor did any of the parties submit materials that could be considered 
on a motion for summary judgment. Rather than drawing all reasonable inferences in 
favor of Turner, the trial court instead assumed—without having received any affidavits 
or other evidence—the existence of facts adverse to Turner. Hie trial court therefore 
erred when it considered matters not on the face of Turner's pleadings and not submitted 
in accordance with Rule 56. 
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In sum, the trial court failed to apply the correct standard for evaluating a Rule 
12(b)(6) motion when it required Turner to affirmatively plead facts avoiding Staker's 
statute of limitations defense, and when it relied on the existence of unpleaded and 
unsupported facts. 
B. The Trial Court Erroneously Interpreted the Exception Set Forth in 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 786-2-225(8) to Require a Legal Right to Possess 
Real Property-
Even if the trial court had correctly applied the standard for evaluating Rule 
12(b)(6) motions, it erred in concluding that Staker could not qualify as any person in 
actual possession or control of the improvement for purposes of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
78B-2-225(8). Although this Court may properly reverse and remand for further 
proceedings based solely on the trial court's failure to apply the correct standard for 
granting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, it may nevertheless review the trial court's 
interpretation of Section 225. See State v. Cloud, 111 P.2d 750, 755 (Utah 1986) ("When 
a new trial or further proceeding is ordered, it is our duty to pass upon questions of law 
which may be pertinent and helpful in arriving at a final determination of the case." 
(quoting Lope* v. Lopes, 518 P.2d 687, 688 (Utah 1974))). 
In ruling that Turner's claims against Staker did not fit the exception set forth in 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(8), the trial court explained: 
The term "otherwise" means "in a different manner, in another way, or 
in other ways." A Court must assume that each term in a statute or 
regulation was used advisedly; thus, words are read literally, unless such 
a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. "Otherwise" must be 
read in context of the surrounding terms, i.e. "owner, tenant." 
"Otherwise" must be read as akin to or of the same nature as 
"ownership" or "tenancy" and by virtue of that, Defendant Staker & 
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Parson Companies had the legal right to possess and control 1-15. . . . 
Defendant Staker & Parson Companies as a contracting provider was not 
an "owner, tenant, or otherwise" of 1-15. Accordingly, as a matter of 
law, § 78B-2-225(8) does not apply. 
(R. at 53.) The trial court thus interpreted subsection (8) to require a legal interest in real 
property. However, such an interpretation improperly relies on a secondary rule of 
construction that is contrary to the Legislature's intent as evidenced by the plain language 
of the statute. 
1. The trial court erred to the extent it found that subsection (8) 
categorically excludes "providers" from its purview. 
In reviewing the Order, it appears that the trial court interpreted subsection (8) to 
mean that a provider can never be "any person in actual possession or control." {See R. 
at 53 ("Defendant Staker & Parson Companies as a contracting provider was not an 
'owner, tenant, or otherwise' of 1-15.").) The limitations imposed by Section 225 apply 
solely to "provider[s]," and if subsection (8) were construed to categorically exclude 
"providers," the exception would be rendered entirely superfluous—a result to be 
avoided. See LKL Assocs., Inc. v. Farley, 2004 UT 51, f 7, 94 P.3d 279 ("This court also 
interprets statutes to give meaning to all parts, and avoids rendering portions of the 
statute superfluous."). Staker's status as a provider therefore did not automatically 
exclude it from the exception in subsection (8). 
2. The trial court's ruling was inconsistent with the intent and 
purpose of the Legislature as evidenced by the plain language of 
the statute. 
When interpreting statutes, this Court's "primary goal is to evince the true intent 
and purpose of the Legislature." Archuleta v. St. Mark's Hosp., 2010 UT 36, f^ 8, 238 
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P.3d 1044 (quoting Duke v. Graham, 2007 UT 31, t 1 6 , 158 P.3d 540). Indeed, "the 
cardinal rule [is] that the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall control, 
and . . . all the parts [should] be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its manifest 
object." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^  17, 66 P.3d 592 (quoting Faux v. Mickelsen, 
725 P.2d 1372, 1375 (Utah 1986)). In determining the Legislature's intent and purpose, 
this Court looks first and foremost to the plain language of the statute. Id. Specifically, 
this Court looks to the plain language of the statute as a whole, "because 'a statute is 
passed as a whole and not in parts or sections and is animated by one general purpose and 
intent/" Archuleta, 2010 UT 36, <{ 8 (quoting Sill v. Hart, 2007 UT 45, % 1, 162 P.3d 
1099). 
Here, the trial court's ruling was inconsistent with the plain language of Section 
225(8). First, as noted above, courts interpret statutes to give effect to all parts and avoid 
making any portion superfluous. LKL Associates, 2004 UT 51,^7. If subsection (8) 
were construed to require a legal right to possess real property, the term "control" would 
be rendered superfluous, because a person without a legal possessory right would be 
excluded from the exception, even if he was undisputedly in actual control of the 
improvement. 
Second, in construing the phrase "owner, tenant, or otherwise," the trial court did 
not apply the plain meaning of the term "otherwise." "When discerning the plain 
meaning ol [aj statute, terms that are used in common, daily, nontechnical speech, 
should, in the absence of evidence of a contrary intent, be given the meaning which they 
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have for laymen in such daily usage.'" O'Dea v. Olea, 2009 UT 46,132, 217 P.3d 704 
(citation omitted). Moreover, "statutory words are read literally, unless such a reading is 
unreasonably confused or inoperable." Stephens v. Bonneville Travel, 935 P.2d 518, 520 
(Utah 1997) (citation omitted). Read literally, the term "otherwise," when paired with a 
noun, adjective, or adverb, is defined in ordinary usage "to indicate its contrary or to 
suggest an indefinite alternative" and is synonymous with the term "not." MERRIAM 
WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 823-24 (10th ed. 1994). In the context of 
subsection (8), the term "otherwise" literally means not an "owner" or "tenant." In other 
words, while subsection (8) requires actual possession or control, it does not require 
ownership or tenancy. Owners and tenants are merely illustrative examples of persons 
who might be in actual possession or control of an improvement. Cf Boyle v. 
Christensen, 2011 UT 20, <[j 27, 680 Utah Adv. Rep. 4 ("Because the statute does not say 
'must include,' we interpret the list of examples as just that—examples that satisfy the 
definition previously stated, but not an exclusive list."). 
The literal, plain meaning of the term "otherwise" is highlighted by the 
Legislature's use of the term in other statutes. For example, a "debt" is defined as "a 
legally enforceable monetary obligation or liability of an individual, whether arising out 
of contract, tort, or otherwise." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-5-502(l) (emphasis added). 
Contracts and torts are common law claims at law, but clearly a judgment on an equitable 
claim or a statutory right of action would constitute a debt. The Legislatures use of the 
term "otherwise" in a series of two is particularly illustrative of its plain and literal 
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meaning. For example, except in the case of personal injury or property damage, aan 
action for defective design or construction is limited to breach of the contract, whether 
written or otherwise" Id. at § 78B-4-513(l) (emphasis added). Similarly, a plaintiff can 
claim interest on special damages for personal injury, "whether the injury was fatal or 
otherwise" Id. at § 78B-5-824(l) (emphasis added). A contract is either written or it is 
"not," and an injury is either fatal or it is "not." The plain and literal meaning of the term 
"otherwise" is very clear—it means "not." 
In interpreting the plain language of an exception similar to subsection (8), the 
Supreme Court of Louisiana provided useful guidance: 
[I]t is clear that although the statute specifically names owners, lessors or 
tenants as a person in possession or control of the improvement to the 
immovable, it expands that enumeration with the use of the word, 
otherwise. As the Legislature's chosen language evidences, it did not 
limit this preemptive exception to owners, lessors or tenants. Thus, 
contractors were not preclusively excepted. 
Rando v. Anco Insulations Inc., 16 So. 3d 1065, 1083 (La, 2009), Moreover, courts have 
recognized that "[a]ll contractors, developers, etc. are in control of the project at some 
stage of its development." Eden v. Tine, 148 Cal. Rptr. 215, 219 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978) 
(explaining that exception applies to person in possession/control at the time of the 
injury, not the time of construction). In Vega v. United States, the court found that the 
United States had the requisite control of an improvement "even though that control 
[was] not sufficient to hold the United States liable for general premises liability." 512 F. 
Supp. 2d 853, 860 (W.D. Tex. 2007). Thus, if Staker was in actual possession or control 
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at the time of Turner's injury, it falls within the exception regardless of whether it had a 
legal right to possess 1-15. 
This interpretation is consistent with the animating purpose and intent of the 
Legislature as expressly stated in the text of the statute itself. In prefacing the limitations 
of Section 225, the Legislature declared: 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, 
omissions, or breach of duty after the possibility of injury or damage has 
become highly remote and unexpected[] creates costs and hardships to 
the provider and the citizens of the state; 
(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, 
records storage costs, undue and unlimited liability risks during the life 
of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in defending 
against claims many years after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic 
evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote 
and unexpected seven years following completion or abandonment; and 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests 
of the citizens of the state to impose the periods of limitation and repose 
provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or against a provider 
arising out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an 
improvement. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(2). 
Thus, the Legislature sought to protect "providers" from defending against claims 
that arise long after they complete or abandon a project and have no reason to expect such 
claims to arise. The trial court erred in failing to consider subsection (8) in light of this 
express legislative intent. Where a party has long abandoned a project, it has neither an 
opportunity to correct dangerous conditions, and it is unlikely to receive prompt notice of 
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injuries that occur. For example, if a homeowner hires a third-party contractor to install a 
stair railing that deteriorates over time and eventually fails, that contractor is unlikely to 
have had any opportunity to discover, much less repair, the defective railing. Nor will 
that contractor be in a position to immediately become aware of injuries caused by the 
defective railing. 
When a party is in actual possession or control of an improvement, by contrast, it 
has the opportunity to cure dangerous conditions and is highly likely to have notice of 
injuries that occur. The present case is a prime example. As alleged in the Complaint, at 
the time of Turner's injury, Staker was performing construction on 1-15 and was 
responsible for implementing and maintaining adequate safety measures. (R. at 4.) 
Staker was therefore in a position to discover and cure defects in those safety measures. 
By the same token, Staker was in a position to receive prompt notice of the multiple 
accidents occurring in the construction zone, including Turner's accident. Turner's 
injuries did not occur "after the possibility of injury or damage ha[d] become highly 
remote," but precisely when the possibility of injury was the least remote. The trial 
court's ruling that subsection (8) requires a legal right of possession is incongruent with 
the Legislature's express intent and purpose. If Staker had signed a lease giving it a right 
to possess the relevant portion of 1-15, the possibility of injury would not have become 
any more or less remote. 
In Salesian Society v. Formigli Corp., the court, reviewing a similar statute, 
explained that "[t]he legislative disposition was to exclude from liability persons, such as 
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architects and contractors, who have been long out of possession of the property and long 
without the right or duty to make inspections and repairs." 295 A.2d 19, 24 (N. J. Super. 
Ct. Law Div. 1972). In requiring actual possession or control of an improvement, as 
opposed to legal title to real property, the Legislature was focused on a party's physical 
possession or control of the construction project, and not whether the party had received a 
legal interest in the underlying real property. Cf. Link v. Bakshi, 539 F. Supp. 2d 846 
(W.D. Va. 2008) (finding franchisor to be in control of improvement even where 
franchisee maintained right to possess premises without interference). Had the 
Legislature been concerned with a legal right to possess real property, and wanted to 
exclude mere "control," it could have drafted subsection (8) to conform to this intent. 
See MINN. STAT. § 541.051, subd. 1(d) ("Nothing in this section shall apply to actions for 
damages resulting from negligence in the maintenance, operation or inspection of the real 
property improvement against the owner or other person in possession."). 
In summary, the plain language of subsection (8), viewed in light of the 
Legislature's express intent, does not require a legal right to possess real property. All 
that subsection (8) requires is that the defendant be in actual possession or control of the 
improvement at the time of the plaintiffs injury. The trial court erred in finding that 
Turner could not, under any set of facts, prove that Staker fits this exception. 
3. The trial court improperly employed a secondary rule of 
construction to reach a result inconsistent with the plain 
language of the statute and with the Legislatures intent. 
"When the plain meaning of the statute can be discerned from its language, no 
other interpretive tools are needed." LPIServs. v. McGee, 2009 UT 41, t 11, 215 P.3d 
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135. While rules of construction are sometimes useful, they are "poor masters, and they 
should not be regarded as having any such rigidity as to have the force of law." Id. ^ 15 
(citation omitted). 
Here, despite its acknowledgment that the term "otherwise" typically means "in a 
different manner, in another way, or in other ways," the trial court construed the term 
"otherwise" as "akin to or of the same nature as 'ownership' or 'tenancy.'" (R. at 53.) 
This is a canon of construction known as ejusdem generis, which instructs that "when 
general words or terms follow specific ones, the general must be understood as applying 
to things of the same kind as the specific." Freund v. Utah Power & Light Co., 793 P.2d 
362, 367 (Utah 1990). For example, in construing the phrase "fence, wall, barricade, or 
obstruction," this Court applied ejusdem generis to hold that that "the term obstruction 
refers to those barriers that are similar to fences, walls, and barricades," and that a 
building was therefore not an obstruction. Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gifford-Overton, 
LLC, 2009 UT 27, If 34, 207 P.3d 1235. 
In applying ejusdem generis to subsection (8), the trial court erred in several 
respects. First, as with other secondary rules of construction, this Court has long held 
that ejusdem generis does not apply unless the plain language is ambiguous. Freund, 793 
P.2d at 367; Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab County, 93 P. 53, 56-58 (Utah 1907); 
accord, e.g., State v. Tanner, 2009 UT App 326, ^ 16, 221 P.3d 901. In Bonneville 
Lumber Co. v. J.G. Peppard Seed Co., this Court declined to resort to ejusdem generis 
and aptly explained that "[i]t is a cardinal rule of construction, and the first to be applied 
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whenever construction becomes necessary, that, unless technical terms are used, the 
language must be given its plain, ordinary, and obvious meaning." 271 P. 226, 228 (Utah 
1928). In Freund, this Court declined to apply ejusdem generis to the term "any other 
person whomsoever," explaining that "[t]he phrase . . . is unqualified. It plainly includes 
third parties." 793 P.2d at 367; accord, e.g., Great Salt Lake Auth. v. Island Ranching 
Co., 414 P.2d 963, 966 (Utah 1966) (declining to apply ejusdem generis to the term "or 
other lawful means," where the meaning was apparent from the context of the statute as a 
whole). Simply put. ejusdem generis is inapplicable "when the object of the act and the 
intention is that the general word shall be understood in its ordinary sense." Nephi 
Plaster, 93 P. at 58. 
Here, in light of the express intent of the Legislature, and the plain language of 
subsection (8), the term "otherwise" is not ambiguous and should be construed in 
accordance with the cardinal rule of construction to look at the plain and ordinary 
meaning of the term. As explained above, the term "otherwise" is synonymous with 
"not." In relying on ejusdem generis, the trial court's construction of the term 
"otherwise" was not only different from the literal meaning of "otherwise," but was 
exactly the opposite of the literal meaning. An application of the plain meaning of 
"otherwise" would be something "not" an owner or a tenant. The trial court, however, 
turned the literal meaning on its head and held that "otherwise" means something "akin" 
to an owner or tenant. h\ doing so, the trial court improperly employed a secondary rule 
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of construction to reach a conclusion contrary to the result demanded by a principal rule 
of construction. 
Second, even if the trial court had otherwise properly resorted to a secondary 
canon of construction, it was inappropriate for the trial court to employ ejusdem generis 
to reach a result inconsistent with express legislative intent. See State v. Ireland, 2006 
UT 17, Tf 16, 133 P.3d 396 ("No canon of construction can be used to construe a statue in 
a way that is inconsistent with legislative intent."). Although the language of a statute 
must be construed in the context of the statute as a whole, e.g., Olsen v. Eagle Mountain 
City, 2011 UT 10, ^  12, 248 P.3d 465, the trial court glossed over the plain language of 
the statute as a whole—namely, the fact that Section 225 was enacted to prevent remote 
and unexpected liability. As explained more fully above, the conclusion that subsection 
(8) requires a legal right to possess real property is inconsistent with this express 
legislative intent because it severely restricts the application of the exception in 
subsection (8) in a manner that belies such intent. 
Finally, ejusdem generis should not be applied "where the things enumerated are 
exhaustive of all things of a like nature so that there is nothing left to which the general 
words can apply." State v. Davis, 184 P. 161, 166 (Utah 1919); accord Ireland, 2006 UT 
17, \ 14. The terms "owner" and "tenant" are broad enough to embrace every 
conceivable kind of legal right to possess real property. An "owner" is defined as "the 
person who has one or more interests," RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 10, and an 
"interest" is defined "generically to include varying aggregates of rights, privilege, 
23 
powers and immunities and distributively to mean any one of them," id § 5. Similarly, a 
"tenant" is defined as "[o]ne who holds or possesses lands or tenements by any kind of 
right or title." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1192 (Abr. 7th ed. 2000). Thus the terms 
"owner" and "tenant" exhaust the types of possessory rights in land, and the term 
"otherwise" should be understood according to its plain meaning—i.e., a person who is 
not an owner or a tenant. 
In short, instead of focusing on the plain language of subsection (8) in the context 
of the whole statute, and in particular the Legislature's stated intent, the trial court 
employed a secondary rule of construction to reach a result contrary to the plain language 
and intent of the Legislature. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in ruling that Turner failed to state a claim against Staker 
upon which relief can be granted. The trial court failed to apply the correct standard for 
reviewing a motion to dismiss, and it incorrectly determined that the exception set forth 
in UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-2-225(8) requires a legal right to possess real property. 
Accordingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's Order and remand for further 
proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 17th day of June, 2011 
BENNETT\TUELLER(}OHNSO 
Joshua a. Lee 
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Utah Code Ann § 78B-2-225 (2011) 
§ 78B-2-225 Actions related to improvements m real property 
(1) As used in this section 
(a) "Abandonment" means that there has been no design or construction activity on the improvement for a con-
tinuous period of one year 
(b) "Action" means any claim for judicial, arbitral, oi administrative relief for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of 
duty ansmg out of or related to the design, construction, or installation of an improvement, whether based m tort, con-
tract, warranty, strict liability, indemnity, contribution, or other source of law 
(c) "Completion of improvement" means the date of substantial completion of an improvement to real property as 
established by the earliest of 
(l) a Certificate of Substantial Completion, 
(n) a Certificate of Occupancy issued by a governing agency, or 
(m) the date of first use or possession of the improvement 
(d) "Improvement" means any building, structure, infrastructure, road, utility, or other similar man-made change, 
addition, modification, or alteration to real property 
(e) "Person" means an individual, corporation, limited liability company, partnership, joint venture, association, 
proprietorship, or any other legal or governmental entity 
(f) "Pro\ idcr" me ins m\ per on contributing to pro\idma or performing studies phns specifications dnwm s 
design^, value uigiiiLumg, LO^ L OI qudiitit) c^umalu^, ^uive)5, staking, constiuction, and the icw^v\, obbuvauon, ad 
ministration, management, supervision, mspections, and tests of construction for or in relation to an improvement 
(2) The Legislature finds that 
(a) exposing a provider to suits and liability for acts, errors, omissions, or breach of dut) after the possibility of 
injury or damage has become highly remote and unexpectedly creates costs and hardships to the provider and the citi-
zens of the state, 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-2-225 
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(b) these costs and hardships include liability insurance costs, records storage costs, undue and unlimited liability 
risks during the life of both a provider and an improvement, and difficulties in defending against claims many years 
after completion of an improvement; 
(c) these costs and hardships constitute clear social and economic evils; 
(d) the possibility of injury and damage becomes highly remote and unexpected seven years following completion 
or abandonment; and 
(e) except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens of the state to impose the periods 
of limitation and repose provided in this chapter upon all causes of action by or against a provider arising out of or re-
lated to the design, construction, or installation of an improvement. 
(3) (a) An action by or against a provider based in contract or warranty shall be commenced within six years of the 
date of completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. Where an express contract or warranty estab-
lishes a different period of limitations, the action shall be initiated within that limitations period. 
(b) All other actions by or against a provider shall be commenced within two years from the earlier of the date of 
discovery of a cause of action or the date upon which a cause of action should have been discovered through reasonable 
diligence. If the cause of action is discovered or discoverable before completion of the improvement or abandonment of 
construction, the two-year period begins to nan upon completion or abandonment 
(4) Notwithstanding Subsection (3)(b), an action may not be commenced against a provider more than nine years 
after completion of the improvement or abandonment of construction. In the event the cause of action is discovered or 
discoverable in the eighth or ninth year of the nine-year period, the injured person shall have two additional years from 
that date to commence an action. 
(5) Subsection (4) does not apply to an action against a provider: 
(a) who has fraudulently concealed his act, error, omission, or breach of duty, or the injury, damage, or other loss 
caused by his act, error, omission, or breach of duty; or 
(b) for a willful or intentional act, error, omission, or breach of duty. 
(6) If a person otherwise entitled to bring an action did not commence the action within the periods prescribed by 
Subsections (3) and (4) solely because that person was a minor or mentally incompetent and without a legal guardian, 
that person shall have two years from the date the disability is removed to commence the action. 
(7) This section shall not apply to an action for the death of or bodily injury to an individual while engaged in the 
design, installation, or construction of an improvement. 
(8) The time limitation imposed by this section does not apply to any action against any person in actual possession 
or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition of the im-
provement proximately causes the injury for which the action is brought. 
(9) This section does not extend the period of limitation or repose otherwise prescribed by law or a valid and en-
forceable contract. 
(10) This section does not create or modify any claim or cause of action. 
(11) This section applies to all causes of action that accrue after May 3, 2003, notwithstanding that the improve-
ment was completed or abandoned before May 3, 2004. 
HISTORY: C. 1953, 78-12-25.5, enacted by L. 1991, ch. 290, § 1; 1997, ch. 149, § 1; renumbered by L. 1999, ch. 123, 
§ 1; 2004, ch. 327, § 1; renumbered by L. 2008, ch. 3, § 663. 
NOILfc: REPEALS AND RELNAC1MEN lb. --Laws 1991, ch. 290, § 1 repeals tormei § 7'8-12-25.5, as last amended 
by Laws 1988, ch. 61, § 1, relating to the seven-year limitation on actions for injuries due to defective improvements to 
real property, effective April 29, 1991, and enacts the present section. 
AMENDMENT NOTES. -The 2004 amendment, effective May 3, 2004, substituted "seven years" for "ten years" in 
Subsection (2)(d); in Subsection (4), substituted "eighth or ninth year" for "eleventh or twelfth year" and "nine years" 
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for "12 years" twice; in Subsection (11), substituted the years "2003" and "2004" for "1998" and "1999"; and made two 
minor stylistic changes. 
The 2008 amendment, effective February 7, 2008, renumbered this section, which formerly appeared as § 78-12-21.5, 
and in (8), substituted "does not apply" for "shall not apply." 
CROSS-REFERENCES. -Product Liability Act, statute of limitations, § 78B-6-706. 
Wrongful death, §§ 78B-3-102, 78B-3-106. 
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Running of statute. 
Statute of repose. 
Cited. 
CONSTITUTIONALITY. 
Former seven-year limitation was applicable to the owner or tenant in possession at time of construction, or to his 
successors; those in possession and control of realty had a continuing duty to make repairs, and should discover any 
fault in construction within seven years; claim that the statute was unconstitutional was without merit. Good v. Chris-
tensen, 527 P.2d223 (Utah 1974). 
The former section violated the open courts provision of the Utah constitution {Utah Const, art I, § 11) because it did 
not provide an injured person with an effective and reasonable alternative remedy for vindication of his or her constitu-
tional interest, and abrogation of the remedy is arbitrary and unreasonable. Sun Valley Water Beds of Utah, Inc. v. Herm 
Hughes & Son, 782 P. 2d 188 (Utah 1989). 
The former section denied a remedy for injury to one's person or property when the injury was caused by a latent de-
fect and was therefore unconstitutional under the open courts provision of the Utah constitution {Utah Const, art. I, § 
11). Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Given the legislative intent in enacting this section, and the remote chance of injury or damage after a period of years, 
the statute is not an arbitrary or unreasonable means of eliminating the stated evils, and is constitutional under the open 
courts clause of the state constitution. Craftsman Bldr. 's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194. 
APPLICABILITY. 
This statute applies to products liability actions when they relate to improvements in real property. Craftsman Bldr. 's 
Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194. 
This section merely prescribes certain situations to which the periods of repose do not apply; it does not purport to set 
up a substitute remedy. Craftsman Bldr. 's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194. 
This section did not bar claim against property developer whose activities involved determining boundaries, size, lo-
cation, and placement of lands, as those were not improvements to the property. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sun-
dance Dev. Corp., 2003 UT App 367, 485 Utah Adv. Rep. 32, 78 P.3d 995. 
DISCOVFRY DOCTRTNF 
Hie diseovei) doctiiac was inapposite in an action ioi nijuiicb ^u^iamed when plauuiUs stiuck a pole on a city-
constructed sled-run, where the defect, if it was such, was patent, and there was no injury inflicted that was unknown at 
the time of its infliction. Jackson v. Layton City, 743 P.2d 1196 (Utah 1987). 
In dispute between home sellers and home buyers, a trial court did not err in applying an equitable discovery rule be-
cause this section does not include an applicable discovery rule. Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT App 101, 574 Utah Adv. Rep. 
15, 158 P. 3d 562. 
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EXPRESS WARRANTY. 
Without evidence of an express warranty period, let alone one extending beyond six years, plaintiff was unable to 
satisfy this section. Craftsman Bldr. 's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT18, 974 P.2d 1194. 
RUNNING OF STATUTE. 
Plaintiffs slander of title and tortious interference claims against a builder did not accrue until after the house was sold 
at a foreclosure sale by the bank, when plaintiff first became able to demonstrate special damages. Valley Colour, Inc., 
v. Beuchert Bldrs., Inc., 944 P.2d 361 (Utah 1997). 
STATUTE OF REPOSE. 
The former section was a statute of repose, and not a statute of limitations, because it barred all actions against plan-
ners, designers, and builders of improvements to real property for injuries occurring after seven years from the date of 
construction, as well as actions based on injuries occurring within the seven-year period if no action is filed within that 
period. Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087 (Utah 1989). 
Fifteen year time between construction of building and collapse of its roof barred a cause of action because this sec-
tion acts not as a statute of limitation but as a statute of repose, for which latency of a defect does not toll the limitation 
period. Craftsman Bldr. 's Supply, Inc. v. Butler Mfg. Co., 1999 UT 18, 974 P.2d 1194. 
Where a faulty electrical system in an apartment building caused a fire approximately eighteen years after it was built, 
this section barred the plaintiffs' action. Olsen v. McMillen Elec, 1999 UT 19, 976 P.2d 606. 
CITED in Katsos v. Salt Lake City Corp., 634 F. Supp. 100 (D. Utah 1986); Lichtefeldv. Cutshaw, 784 P.2d 143 (Utah 
1989); Stilling v. Skankey, 784 P.2d 144 (Utah 1989); Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Ass'n v. Daven-
court at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, 221 P. 3d 234. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. —What statute of limitations governs action by contractee for defective or improper performance of work by 
private building contractor, 1 A.L.R.3d914. 
Time of discovery as affecting running of statute of limitations in wrongful death action, 49 A.L.RAth 972. 
Application of statute of limitations in private tort actions based on injury to persons or property caused by under-
ground flow of contaminants, / / A.L.R. 5th 438. 
What constitutes "improvement to real property" for purposes of statute of repose or statute of limitations, 122 
A.L.R. 5th 1. 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KENT S. TURNER, an individual 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STAKER & PARSON COMPANIES, a Utah 
corporation, and ATLAS ENGINEERING, 
L.L.C., a Utah limited liability company, 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF 
DEFENDANT STAKER & PARSON 
COMPANIES, A UTAH LIMITED 
LIABILITY CORPORATION, WITH 
PREJUDICE 
Date: February 11,2011 
Case No.: 100402347 
Judge Lynn W. Davis 
On November 10,2010, the Court heard oral* arguments on Defendant Staker & Parson 
Companies5 Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, George W. Burbidge II of 
Christiansen & Jensen, P.C., appeared on behalf of Defendant Staker & Parson Companies. 
David M, Kono of Bennett Tueller Johnson & Deere appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. 
The Court, having reviewed the motion, memoranda, other filings, and having heard oral 
arguments, finds that Plaintiffs Complaint and Amended Complaint allege that on July 17, 2006 
Plaintiff was injured in an accident arising out of or related to Defendant Staker & Parson 
Companies' work-onJ-15 as a contractor for the Utah Department of Transportation. Plaintiff 
alleges in his Complaint and Amended Complaint that the duration of the construction project 
Defendant Staker & Parson Companies was working on at the time of Plaintiffs accident was 
approximately two weeks. Given the severity of Plaintiff s claimed injuries, the Court finds that 
Plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered through reasonable diligence, that he had a cause 
of action against Defendant Staker & Parson Companies as of the date of the accident. The Court 
further finds that Defendant Staker & Parson Companies was a "Provider" as the term is defined 
in Utah Code Annotated § 78B-2-225(l)(f). Plaintiffs suit against Defendant Staker & Parson 
Companies constitute an "action" as that term is defined in § 78B-2-225(l)(b). Therefore, the 
two-year limitation period found m § 78B-2 225(3)(b) applies to Plaintiffs claims against 
Defendant Staker & Parson Companies. The above-captioned action was filed on July 13, 2010, 
and is therefore untimely. 
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The Court specifically rejects Plaintiffs reliance upon the "exception" contained in § 
78B-2-301(8) which provides: 
The time limitation imposed by this section does not apply to any action against 
any person in actual possession or control of the improvement as owner, tenant, or 
otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe condition of the improvement 
proximately causes the injury for which the action is brought. 
Nowhere in the complaint does Plaintiff allege that Defendant Staker & Parson 
Companies was in actual possession or control of the improvement. In fact, the general allegation 
(at paragraph 7) claims that Defendant Staker & Parson Companies contracted with the Utah 
Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). 
In addition, Plaintiff makes no claim that Defendant Staker & Parson Companies were in 
actual possession or control as owner, tenant or otherwise, at the time any defective or unsafe 
condition of the improvement proximately caused the injury. 
The State of Utah (UDOT) is not a lessor/landlord and Defendant Staker & Parson 
Companies was not a tenant on 1-15. Defendant Staker & Parson Companies was not the owner 
of 1-15; Defendant Staker & Parson Companies did not own the fee and did not have the right to 
sell, convey, or dispose of 1-15. 
The term "otherwise" means "in a different manner, in another way, or in other ways." A 
Court must assume that each term in a statute or regulation was used advisedly; thus, words are 
read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably confused or inoperable. "Otherwise" must be 
read in context of the surrounding terms, i.e. "owner, tenant." "Otherwise" must be read as akin 
to or of the same nature as "ownership" or "tenancy" and by virtue of that, Defendant Staker & 
Parson Companies had the legal right to possess and control 1-15. No such allegation appears in 
the pleadings. In fact, the only allegation, that Defendant Staker & Parson Companies was a 
contractor, casts Defendant Staker & Parson Companies as a "provider" under § 78B-2-225(2)(e) 
which provides: 
except as provided in Subsection (7), it is in the best interests of the citizens of the 
state to impose the periods of limitation and repose provided in this chapter upon 
all causes of action by or against & provider arising out of or related to the design, 
construction, or installation of an improvement, (emphasis added). 
Defendant Staker & Parson Companies as a contracting provider was not an "owner, 
tenant, or otherwise" of 1-15. Accordingly as a matter of law, § 7813-2-225(8) does not apply. 
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The applicable statute of limitations, as argued by Defendant Staker & Parson Companies is set 
forth in § 78B-2-225(3)(b) 
Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
Defendant Staker & Parson Companies' Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim is 
hereby GRANTED. The above-captioned action against Defendant Staker & Parson Companies 
is hereby DISMISSED with prejudice. 
rr/ 
Dated this //lm of /~eJh/< 
Fourth Judicial Di&&$Coj&£'•%$& 
A certificate of mailing is on the following page. 
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 100402347 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
MAIL: GEORGE W BDRBIDGE II CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN PC 15 WEST SOUTH 
TEMPLE STE 800 SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84101 
MAIL: BENJAMIN D JOHNSON 3165 B MILLROCK 9R.($(TE ,500 SALT LAKE CITY 
UT 84121-5039 ^ W ^ k -
Date: .^/ | l / f H^gfSBSt0&. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of June 2011,1 caused to be served, via U.S. 
Mail, First Class, two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT, together with an electronic Courtesy Brief in searchable PDF format, 
upon the following: 
George W. Burbidge, II 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
15 West South Temple, Suite 800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
Stoker & Parson Companies 
BENNETT TUELLERJOHNS 
Joshua L. L)ee 
Attormytfjor Plaintiff and Appellant Kent S. Turner 
& DEERE 
